Счастье и демократия, 1972-2008 by Inglehart, Ronald F. et al.
– 1097 –
Journal of  Siberian Federal University.  Humanities & Social Sciences 8 (2013 6) 1097-1106 
~ ~ ~
УДК 330.12:321.7
Happiness and Democracy,  
1972-2008
Ronald F. Inglehart* and Еduard D. Ponarin
The National Research University
“Higher School of Economics”
20 Myasnitskaya, Moscow, 101000 Russia
Received 24.07.2013, received in revised form 31.07.2013, accepted 04.08.2013
Before the avalanche of democratization that occurred around 1990, happiness was strongly 
correlated with democracy: at the national level, subjective well-being showed correlations close to 
.8 with such measures of democracy as the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores. 
This could mean that: (1) living under democratic institutions makes people much happier than living 
under authoritarian ones; or (2) high levels of subjective well-being are conducive to democracy. 
It is also possible that the correlation could be spurious or reciprocal. Using data on happiness 
levels of 42 publics from 1981 to 2007 and measures of democracy levels from 1972 to 2008, this 
paper attempts to clarify why subjective well-being is linked with democracy. If democracy causes 
democracy, then transitions to democracy should be followed by dramatic increases in happiness. But 
if happiness is a relatively stable variable that is conducive to democracy but not necessarily raised 
by it, democratization not be followed by rising happiness – and by moving large numbers of less 
happy societies into the ranks of the democracies, a major wave of democratization would weaken the 
subsequent correlation between democracy and happiness.
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Throughout the two decades before the 
massive wave of democratization that occurred 
around 1990, reported happiness levels showed 
strong correlations with all of the widely-
accepted measures of democracy. For example, 
the national-level linkages between subjective 
well-being and the Freedom House political 
rights and civil liberties scores were in the .7 to 
.8 range–a remarkably strong correlation that 
could be interpreted to mean that over half of the 
total variation in life satisfaction and happiness 
was caused by a society’s level of democracy. 
But it could also mean that a society’s level of 
democracy tends to reflect its public’s level of 
subjective well-being. 
Correlation may reflect causal linkages, but 
it does not prove them. There are several possible 
reasons why two variables go together, including 
the possibility that the correlation emerged from 
random processes. With data from more than 80 
societies, the probability that a correlation of this 
strength would emerge randomly is below the .001 
level; and the fact that it emerges repeatedly in 
successive surveys, makes randomness even less 
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likely. The strong correlation between subjective 
well-being and democracy could indicate 
that: (1) living under democratic institutions 
makes people much happier than living under 
authoritarian ones; or (2) high levels of subjective 
well-being are conducive to democracy; or (3) the 
correlation could be spurious, reflecting the fact 
that both subjective well-being and democracy 
are strongly correlated with some other variable 
such as high levels of economic development; or 
(4) happiness and democracy might be linked 
in a reciprocal relationship – possibly with a 
causal flow that is much stronger in one direction 
than the other. The answer to this puzzle has 
far-reaching implications. If the linkage is not 
spurious and democracy makes people happy, 
it is a strong argument for adopting democracy; 
on the other hand, if we find that high levels of 
happiness are conducive to democracy, this may 
help us understand how democracy emerges and 
flourishes. 
Using data on happiness levels of 42 publics 
for which we have substantial time series evidence 
from 1981 to 2007 from the Values Surveys, and 
the Freedom House measures of democracy 
levels from 1972 to 2008, this paper attempts to 
clarify whether democracy leads to happiness 
or happiness is conducive to democracy. If 
democracy produces happiness, then transitions 
to democracy should be followed by dramatic 
increases in happiness within the countries that 
make the transition. But if happiness is a relatively 
stable variable that is conducive to democracy but 
not necessarily raised by it, democratization need 
not be followed by rising happiness. In fact, by 
moving large numbers of less happy societies 
into the ranks of the democracies, a major wave 
of democratization would weaken the subsequent 
correlation between democracy and happiness.
Though the political culture literature has 
argued that interpersonal trust and tolerance play 
an important role in the emergence and flourishing 
of democratic institutions, it has largely neglected 
the role of subjective well-being. But it is logical 
to that expect high levels of happiness and life 
satisfaction would be linked with democracy. 
Political economy research demonstrates that if 
the economic cycle has been going well, support 
for the incumbents increases. Support for a 
democratic regime reflects a much deeper long-
term processes. If, in the long run, people feel 
that life has been good under a given regime, it 
gives rise to feelings of legitimacy and diffuse 
support for that regime. High levels of subjective 
well-being can also help stabilize authoritarian 
regimes, but authoritarian systems can survive 
through coercion; democratic regimes, on the 
other hand, must have mass support or they can 
be voted out of existence as was the Weimar 
republic. Thus, societies with happy publics are 
relatively likely to remain democratic in the long 
term. Accordingly, Inglehart (1990) found that 
happiness is strongly related to democracy (cf. 
Frey & Stutzer, 2000; Inglehart & Klingemann, 
2000).
There is another reason why happiness is 
linked with democracy. High levels of happiness 
and life satisfaction are part of a syndrome of 
interpersonal trust, tolerance and political activism 
(“Self-expression values”) that leads people to 
give high priority to free choice in all domains 
of life–including political freedom. Economic 
growth tends to produce cultural changes in which 
the public gradually places increasing emphasis 
on autonomy and self-expression–which give 
rise to demands for a more liberal political order 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The emergence of 
democratic institutions increases people’s free 
choice in politics, freedom of expression, and 
freedom to travel. This, in the long run, tends to 
produce higher levels of subjective well-being. 
This relationship seems to be reciprocal: High 
levels of subjective well-being are conducive 
to democracy, and democracy provides a 
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wider range of free choice that is conducive to 
subjective well-being (Haller & Hadler, 2004; 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Ott, 2001; Veenhoven, 
2000; Welsch, 2003). Although this relationship 
is reciprocal, it is asymmetrical. The tendency for 
democratization to bring happiness is uncertain, 
as this paper will demonstrate. In the short term 
(which may be many years), democratization can 
bring declining happiness. For decades before the 
surge of democratization that occurred around 
1990, high levels of subjective well-being were 
linked with democracy. Conversely, low levels 
of subjective well-being were a leading indicator 
of malaise and political instability: authoritarian 
regimes were most likely to collapse in countries 
that had low levels of happiness and overall life 
satisfaction. Since happiness is a relatively stable 
variable, the 1990 wave of democratization moved 
large numbers of relatively unhappy societies 
into the ranks of the democracies–dramatically 
weakening the correlation between democracy 
and happiness as measured in the following 
years.
A remarkably strong relationship existed 
between democracy and the self-reported 
happiness and life satisfaction levels of given 
publics, throughout the period before the 
explosion of democracy around 1990. Fig. 1 
shows this relationship among the 42 countries 
for which we have long-term survey data.1 This 
figure is based on a combined index of subjective 
well-being based on each country’s mean level 
of life satisfaction and happiness, as measured 
in the first two waves of the Values Surveys, 
carried out in 1981 and 1990 respectively.2 Levels 
of subjective well-being were relatively stable 
during this period (correlating at above .8 from 
one wave of surveys to the next). 
 
Fig. 1. The linkage between Happiness and Democracy before the Third Wave of 
Democratization ( r = .81) 
Source: Values Surveys, 1981-1990 and Freedom House scores, 1981-1987. 
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Fig. 1. The linkage b tween Happin ss and Democracy b fore the Third Wave of Democratization ( r = .81)
Source: Values Surveys, 1981-1990 and Freedom House scores, 1981-1987
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Life satisfaction is coded on a 10-point 
scale on which 1 indicates that the respondent is 
not at all satisfied, and 10 indicates the highest 
level of life satisfaction; happiness was coded in 
four categories ranging from 1 “very happy” to 
4 “not at all happy.” In order to give equal weight 
to the two variables (and to produce a scale on 
which high scores indicate high happiness and 
life satisfaction), a Subjective well-being index 
was constructed as follows: Subjective well-
being = life satisfaction – 2.5 * happiness. As 
Fig. 1 demonstrates, happiness and democracy 
were strongly linked: the correlation between 
the two is r = .81. Since the subjective well-being 
levels of given societies were relatively stable, 
one finds equally strong relationships between 
subjective well-being and these countries’ 
Freedom House scores throughout the period 
from 1972 to 1987.
Both democracy and human happiness 
vary a great deal from one society to another. 
The societies examined here range from long-
established democracies such as Britain, Sweden, 
Denmark, the United States and Canada, to 
countries that were extremely authoritarian in 
1981-1986, such as China, Russia, and Bulgaria. 
Happiness levels also vary greatly. For example, 
in Ireland 41 percent of the public described 
themselves as “very happy;” while in Belarus, 
only 5 percent described themselves as “very 
happy.”
Fig. 1 shows a strong correlation between 
subjective well-being and democracy; as we 
have suggested, this linkage could reflect the fact 
that living under democratic institutions makes 
people relatively happy; or that high levels of 
subjective well-being are conducive to democratic 
institutions; or the correlation could be spurious, 
reflecting the fact that both subjective well-being 
and democracy are strongly correlated with some 
other variable. The most likely such variable is 
economic development. For some time, it has 
been clear that the people of rich countries show 
much higher levels of subjective well-being than 
do the people of poor countries (Inglehart, 1990). 
Although for many years, it was debated whether 
economic development was conducive to rising 
levels of subjective well-being, recent research 
makes it reasonably clear that development does 
tend to bring rising happiness–although it does so 
on a curve of diminishing returns: the impact of 
development is much stronger among low-income 
and middle-income countries than it is among rich 
countries, and the fact that, until recently, we only 
had time series data from rich countries, tended to 
conceal the fact that economic development tends 
to bring rising levels of subjective well-being 
(Inglehart et al., 2008; Diener et al., forthcoming; 
Inglehart, forthcoming). 
As modernization theory implies, economic 
development tends to bring both democracy 
and happiness – but the linkage between 
democracy and happiness is not spurious. As 
Table 1 demonstrates, it persists even when we 
control for per capita Gross Domestic Product. 
As Lipset (1959) pointed out long ago, and as 
subsequent research has confirmed repeatedly, 
economic development is strongly linked with 
democracy. A society’s per capita GDP by itself 
explains almost 57 percent of the cross-national 
variation on the Freedom House scores (Model 
1). But subjective well-being by seems to have an 
even stronger impact on democracy–accounting 
for more than 62 percent of the cross-national 
variance (Model 2). Economic development 
and subjective well-being together explain 
fully 67 percent of the variance in democracy 
(Model 3). These findings are consistent with the 
interpretation that economic development tends 
to bring higher levels of subjective well-being, 
which in turn is conducive to higher levels of 
democracy – and that economic development is 
conducive to democracy, in large part, because 
it brings higher levels of subjective well-being. 
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Table 1. Predicting Levels of Democracy in 1986. Dependent variable: combined Freedom House scores, 1986
Independent Variables: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Real GDP per capita, 1980 .825*** _____ .508***
(in $1000 U.S.) (.093) (.071)
Subjective well-being index around 1985 _____ 2.562*** 1.395***
(.250) (.318)
Adjusted R-Squared .568 .624 .671
Number of Countries 43 43 43
In any case, it seems clear that the correlation 
between subjective well-being and democracy 
is not a spurious one, due to the fact that both 
variables are linked with economic development.
During the past two decades, until about 
2008, the world as a whole experienced the 
highest rate of economic growth ever recorded, 
and fully half of the world’s population emerged 
from subsistence-level poverty. These changes 
increased the extent to which the residents of 
these societies have free choice in how to live 
their lives, bringing more economic choice, more 
social tolerance and greater political freedom. 
Inglehart et al (2008) argue that these changes 
have led to rising levels of happiness within most 
societies.
Though they experienced democratization 
and rising social tolerance, in many of the ex-
communist countries the transition to democracy 
and a market economy was accompanied by 
severe economic decline. In Russia, for example, 
real income fell to less than half its pre-transition 
level, and life expectancy declined by several 
years. Democratization did not bring rising 
happiness, as Fig. 2 demonstrates. Although 
democracy, as measured by the Freedom House 
scores, rose sharply in Russia from 1981 to 
1990, happiness did not rise–it actually declined 
somewhat (though happiness levels were much 
more stable than levels of democracy, as is true 
almost everywhere). By 1990, Russia had reached 
a level on the Freedom House scores that moved 
it into the category of countries coded as “Free.” 
But authoritarian rule staged a subsequent 
comeback in Russia, as was reflected in the 
Freedom House scores. By 2006, Russia was 
again coded as strongly authoritarian–but, with 
economic recovery, happiness levels actually 
rose. Democracy and happiness moved on very 
different trajectories.
One way to explain the strong linkage 
between happiness and democracy, would be to 
assume that democracy makes people happy. This 
interpretation is appealing and suggests that we 
have a quick fix for most of the world’s problems: 
adopt a democratic constitution and live happily 
ever after. Unfortunately, the experience of 
Russia and most of the other Soviet successor 
states does not support this interpretation. Since 
their dramatic move toward democracy in 1991, 
their people have not become happier: with a 
sharp decline of their economy and society, many 
of them moved in exactly the opposite direction. 
The correlation between happiness and well-being 
does not simply reflect the fact that democracy 
makes people happy: other factors are at least 
equally important. 
Fig. 3A shows the correlation between 
a society’s level of happiness and its level of 
democracy at each time point for which we have 
data on both happiness and democracy.3 The 
pattern is striking. From 1972 until shortly before 
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1990, the two went together to a remarkably 
strong degree, correlating at near the .7 level. 
With the wave of democratization that occurred 
at that point, the correlation dropped sharply. 
Dozens of countries suddenly made dramatic 
increases on the Freedom House scales, but their 
happiness levels only increased slightly, if at all; 
consequently, by 1995 the correlation between 
happiness and democracy had plummeted to 
about the .25 level, remaining there until the most 
recent measure of democracy in 2008 As is argued 
below, we believe that in the long run, democracy 
does tend to be conducive to happiness, but it is 
clear that democratization does not necessarily 
bring happiness.
Fig. 3B shows the correlation between life 
satisfaction and democracy from 1972 to 2008. 
Although the post-1989 decline is less severe than 
it is with happiness, the basic pattern is strikingly 
similar: from 1972 to 1989, life satisfaction 
levels were correlated with democracy at levels 
that ranged from .7 to .8. The post-1988 wave of 
democratization coincided with a dramatic drop in 
these correlations, falling below .5 and remaining 
around there until 2004; in the last few years, the 
linkage between life satisfaction and democracy 
has been rising, moving up to about .55. Although 
happiness has not yet recovered, with economic 
recovery, life satisfaction did begin to recover. 
Fig. 3C shows the correlation between democracy 
and another indicator of well-being, self-reported 
health – generally a fairly good indicator of 
objective health. The pattern is remarkably similar 
to that found with happiness and life satisfaction. 
We find consistently strong correlations from the 
early 1970s until about 1986–followed by a sharp 
decline that persists through the end of the time 
series. It seems that adopting democracy does not 
 
 
Fig. 2. Happiness and Democracy in Russia, 1981-2006. 
Note: Democracy is measured by the two Freedom House scales, which range from1 to 7; their sum 
ranges from 2 to 14 but since high scores indicate low democracy, their polarity is reversed by 
subtracting them from 14, producing a scale that ranges from 0 to 12. 
Happiness is measured on a scale that ranges from 1 to 4, but since high scores indicate low 
happiness, polarity is reversed by subtracting from 4, producing a scale that ranges from 0 to 3. This 
score is then multiplied by 4 to produce a scale that ranges from 0 to 12– giving both happiness and 
democracy the same 0-12 range. 
The 1981 happiness score is from a surve  in Ta bov oblast, which cl sely parallels the Russian 
republic. 
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Fig. 3. Correlations between subjective well-being and democracy, 1972-2008 
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C. Self-reported health and democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
correlation between reported health levels and democracy, 1972-2008
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
co
rr
el
at
io
n
Fig. 3. Correlations between subjective well-being and democracy, 1972-2008
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automatically result in high levels of perceived 
health, any more than it automatically brings high 
levels of happiness or life satisfaction. The belief 
that institutions determine culture receives no 
support from these data.
Nevertheless, we believe that in the long 
run, democracy does tend to be conducive to 
subjective well-being–though clearly not in a 
determinist relationship. Democracy contributes 
to a climate of free choice that is conducive to 
happiness. People who feel they have relatively 
high levels of control and choice over how their 
lives turn out, consistently report higher levels 
of life satisfaction. Free choice tends to make 
people happier. And rising emphasis on free 
choice favors democracy – the institutions that 
maximize political freedom. But democratic 
institutions are by no means the only factor 
shaping human happiness. Protracted periods 
of economic growth seem to be conducive to 
rising levels of happiness–and severe economic 
decline can have the opposite effect. Similarly, 
the breakdown of the social and political order 
that accompanied the collapse of communism in 
many societies, was linked with declining levels 
of happiness, despite a sharp, sudden increase in 
political rights and civil liberties, as measured by 
the Freedom House indicators. We suspect that 
democratic institutions do contribute to human 
happiness to an appreciable extent, but the causal 
linkage seems to work much more strongly in the 
opposite direction, with democratic institutions 
being much more likely to flourish in a social 
climate characterized by high levels of subjective 
well-being–which are linked with high levels of 
trust, tolerance and emphasis on self-expression 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). 
Fig. 4 shows a path analysis of how this 
works. As Inglehart, Foa, Peterson and Welzel 
(2008) argue, the period from 1981 to 2007 
brought a conjunction of favorable factors. 
Many low-income and middle-income countries 
experienced exceptionally high rates of economic 
growth. Rich countries had less economic growth 
but they experienced remarkable rates of social 
liberation, with hard-core opposition to gender Fig. 4.  
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Прежде, чем лавина демократизации, которая пришлась на период около 1990 года, счастье 
строго коррелировалось с демократией: на национальном уровне субъективное 
благосостояние показало корреляции близко к 8 с такими мерами демократии как 
политические права Дома свободы и множество гражданских свобод. Это могло означать что: 
(1) проживание под демократическими институтами делает людей намного более 
счастливыми, чем проживание под авторитарными; или (2) высокий уровень субъективного 
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субъективное благосостояние соединено с демократией. Если демократия вызывает 
демократию, то переходы к демократии должны сопровождаться драматическими 
увеличениями счастья. Но если счастье – относительно устойчивая переменная, которая 
является способствующей демократии, но не обязательно повышающаяся ею, 
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Notes: Path coefficients are standardized regression weights calculated with AMOS. Number of cases is 
56. Model fit statistics: NFI=.92, IFI=.94, CFI=.93. Explained variance in increase of sense of freedom is 
44% and 62% in increase in subjective well-being. Paths on increase in sense of freedom are calculated 
controlling for the initial level of sense of freedom and paths on subjective well-being growth are 
calculated controlling for the initial subjective well-being level. The effects of the initial sense of freedom 
and subjective well-being levels are not displayed, to produce a more readable chart. A direct path from 
democratization to subjective well-being growth was also specified and found to be insignificant; this 
path is also not displayed. Significance levels: * (p below .10), ** (p below .05), *** (p below .01).  
Source:  Inglehart, Foa, Peterson and Welzel, 2008. 
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Notes: Path coefficients are standardized regression weights calculated with AMOS. Number of cases is 56. Model fit statistics: 
NFI=.92, IFI=.94, CFI=.93. Explained variance in increase of sense of freedom is 44% and 62% in increase in subjective 
well-being. Paths on increase in sense of freedom are calculated controlling for the initial level of sense of freedom and 
paths on subjective well-being growth are calculated controlling for the initial subjective well-being level. The effects of the 
initial sense of freedom and subjective well-being levels are not displayed, to produce a more readable chart. A direct path 
from democratization to subjective well-being growth was also specified and found to be insignificant; this path is also not 
displayed. Significance l vels: * (p b low .10), ** (p below .05), *** (p below .01). 
Source: Inglehart, Foa, Peterson and W lzel, 2008.
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equality and homosexuality falling by roughly 
half since 1981. And in the same period, dozens 
of countries experienced democratization. 
The world as a whole experienced exceptional 
economic growth, widespread democratization 
and increasing tolerance of social diversity. These 
changes expanded freedom of choice, which was 
conducive to rising levels of subjective well-
being. As Figure 4 indicates, democratization 
and rising social tolerance contributed even 
more than economic development to a growing 
sense of free choice, and thus to rising levels of 
happiness. 
There is no guarantee that these rising 
levels of subjective well-being will continue. On 
the contrary, democratization tends to be a one-
shot occurrence. Moreover, since 2008 economic 
growth has given way to severe economic 
decline–which makes it uncertain that social 
liberation will continue. If the recent economic 
decline becomes as severe and protracted as the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, the social and 
political implications are serious. Falling levels 
of subjective well-being were a leading indicator 
of the collapse of former communist systems. 
But these findings also have positive implications 
for social scientists and policymakers, for they 
imply that human happiness is not fixed, but 
can be influenced by belief systems and social 
policies. 
1 The vertical axis is based on the sum of each country’s Freedom House scores for 1981 to 1986, which run from 2 to 14, 
with high scores reflecting low levels of democracy. In order to reverse this polarity, each country’s score was subtracted 
from 14, producing scores ranging from 0 to 12 for any given year, and a maximum score of 72 for the six-year period. The 
original happiness scores ranged from 1 to 4, with high scores indicating low levels of happiness; their polarity was also 
reversed, by subtracting each country’s mean score from 4, to produce scores ranging from 0 to a theoretical maximum 
of 3, which would be obtained if everyone described themselves as “very happy.” Accordingly, on Figure 1, high scores 
indicate high levels of happiness and democracy. Similarly strong correlations emerge when we use a much larger pool of 
nations.
2 These data are from the 1981 European Values Study survey and the 1990 European Values Study and World Values 
Surveys. For further information about these surveys, see the respective web sites: http://www.europeanvalues.nl/ and 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
3 Freedom House provides political rights and civil liberties scores for every year since 1972, but our measures of happiness 
and life satisfaction levels are available only since 1981 and were carried out subsequently only in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 
2006. But the happiness and life satisfaction levels are remarkably stable, even for countries like Russia that experienced 
catastrophic changes: they change so little over time that influential theories have emerged to explain why it is impossible 
for them to change (one interpretation linking them to genetic factors). Consequently, we feel reasonably confident in 
projecting the 1981 levels back to the early 1970s, and in estimating the subjective well-being scores in intermediate years, 
from the empirical readings immediately before and after a given year in which democracy was measured.
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Счастье и демократия, 1972-2008
Р.Ф. Инглхарт, Э.Д. Понарин 
Национальный исследовательский университет 
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Россия 101000, Москва, ул. Мясницкая, 20
Прежде чем пошла лавина демократизации, которая пришлась на период около 1990 года, 
счастье строго коррелировалось с демократией: на национальном уровне субъективное 
благосостояние показало корреляции близко к 8 с такими мерами демократии, как 
политические права, свободы и множество гражданских свобод. Это могло означать, что: (1) 
проживание с демократическими институтами делает людей намного более счастливыми, 
чем проживание с авторитарными; или (2) высокий уровень субъективного благосостояния 
способствует демократии. Также возможно, что корреляция могла быть побочной или 
взаимной. При помощи данных об уровнях счастья 42 выборок с 1981 до 2007 гг. и мер уровней 
демократии с 1972 до 2008 гг. настоящая статья пытается разъяснить, почему субъективное 
благосостояние соединено с демократией. Если демократию вызывает демократия, то 
переходы к демократии должны сопровождаться драматическими увеличениями счастья. 
Но если счастье относительно устойчивая переменная, которая является способствующей 
демократии, но не обязательно повышающаяся ею, демократизация не сопровождается 
возрастающим счастьем – и, перемещая большие количества менее счастливых обществ 
в разряды демократических государств, главная волна демократизации ослабила бы 
последующую корреляцию между демократией и счастьем.
Ключевые слова: счастье, жизненное удовлетворение, демократия, экономическое развитие, 
теория модернизации.
